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DIRECT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT BY THE
UNITED STATES IN CRIMINAL CASES*
PHILIP B. KURLANDt
RICHARD F. WOLFSONIt-
.The Controlling Statute: History, Purpose and Con-
stitutionality. The Sanges case,1 decided in 1892, disclosed
that the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 18912 had left the
United States without any right to appellate review of an
adverse decision of a trial court in a criminal case, even
when a review would not involve double jeopardy. It was
to remedy this situation-whereby "through inadvertence,
the decision of a single judge in a criminal case was allowed
to nullify an act of Congress or construe it out of exis-
tence" 3-- that the Criminal Appeals Act of 19074 was enacted.
This Act was amended in 19425 to provide for appeals to
the Courts. of Appeals in situations where direct appeal to
the Supreme Court was improper and for transfer of ap-
peals fiom the Supreme Court to the Courts of Appeals and
from the Courts of Appeals to the Supreme Court when the
appeal was erroneously taken to the wrong court. In 1948,
at the time of the enactment of Title 18 of the United States
Code into positive law," the Criminal Appeals Act, as
* This article is a draft of part of a revision of ROBERTSON AND
KIRKHAM1, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1936) in which the authors of this article are now engaged. The
views expressed by the authors of this article as to the wisdom of thejurisdictional statute discussed herein, do not necessarily reflect the
views of Mr. Robertson and Mr. Kirkham.
t A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1944, Harvard.
Member of the New York and the United States Supreme Court Bars.
Guggenheim Fellow, 1949-50.
tt A.B. 1942, Harvard, LL.B. 1944, Yale. Member of the New York
and the United States Supreme Court Bars. Guggenheim Fellow,
1949-50.
1. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1891).
2. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517; 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
3. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
113 (1927).
4. Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 STAT. 1246. The legislative
and political history of this statute is interestingly recounted in FRANK-
FURTER AND LANDIS, ep. cit., supra note 3, 113-126.
5. Act of May 9, 1942, c. 295; 56 STAT. 271 (1942).
6. Title 18 of the United States Code was renumbered, codified,
and enacted into positive law in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62
STAT. 862. Prior thereto Title 18 was only "prima facie" evidence of
the law. Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423, 426. At the time
of the codification some changes were made in the language of the
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amended, was reenacted as § 3731 of Title 18. The statute
now reads:
The appeal may be taken by and on behalf ofT the United
States from the district courts s direct to the Supreme Court
of the United States in all criminal cases in the following
instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing
any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such
decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction
of the statute upon which the indictment or information is
founded.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for
insufficiency of the indictment or information, where such
decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar,
when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
* * * * * * * * * *9
statute which appear not to have resulted in any substantive change;
thus, the words "setting aside, or dismissing" an indictment were sub-
stituted for "quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurr6r" to an
indictment. This brought the statute into conformity with the Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts. Rule 54(c). The scope of the language was extended to include "informations"
as well as "indictments" in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273 (1944) ; United
States v. Walsh, 331 U. S. 432 (1947); United States v. Hoy, 330 U. S.
724 (1946).
7. In Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Company, 255 U. S. 102 (1920),
the appeal was taken by the United States Attorney and not by the
United States. The United States need not have been a party in name
to the proceeedings in the trial court. It is sufficient that it is "in
any relevant sense, a party to the proceedings." United States v. Hoff-
man, 335 U. S. 77, 79 (1947).
8. Originally, the Criminal Appeals Act was held inapplicable to
the District Court for the District of Columbia. United States v. Bur-
roughs, 289 U. S. 159 (1932); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S.
534 (1933). The 1942 amendment, adding the transfer provisions, clearly
indicated that the United States Courts in the District of Columbia
are governed by the terms of the statute governing direct appeals by
the United States in criminal cases. And the Supreme Court has acted
in accordance with the principle that the statute should be applied to
the District of Columbia courts. See United States v. Hoffman, 335 U.
S. 77 (1947); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n, 335 U. S. 802 (1947); see also, United States v. Hoffman, 161
F.2d 881 (App. D. C.) (1946).
9. The deleted portions of § 3731 refer to appeals from district
courts to courts of appeals:
"An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States
from the district courts to a court of appeals, in all circumstances, in
the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any in-
dictment or information, or any count thereof except where a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this
section.
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The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty
days after the decision or judgment has been rendered and shall
be diligently prosecuted.
Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal
in the foregoing instances, the defendant shall be admitted to
bail on his own recognizance.
If an appeal shall be taken, pursuant to this section, to
the Supreme Court of the United States which, in the opinion
of that Court, should have been taken to a court of appeals, °
the Supreme Court of the United States shall remand the case
to the court of appeals, which shall then have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the same as if the appeal had been taken
to that court in the first instance.
If an appeal shall be taken pursuant to this section to any
court of appeals, which, in the opinion of such court, should
have been taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States, such court shall certify the case to the Supreme Court
of the United States, which shall thereupon have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the case to the same extent as if an
appeal had been taken directly to that Court.
On its face, the statute reveals three categories of ques-
tions which the Supreme Court can entertain on direct appeal
from the District Court by the United States:
1) Those directed to the validity of a statute on which
the indictment is based, whether raised before or after judg-
ment;
2) Those directed to the construction of the statute
on which the indictment is based, whether raised on motion
before or after judgment;
3) Those directed to the sufficiency of motions in bar,
but only "when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy."
These provisions have been the source of a steady and
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided
by this section."
This portion of the statute was added by the Act of May 9, 1942,
c. 295, 56 STAT. 271.
10. Section 43 of the revision of Title 28, effective on the same
date as the revision of Title 18, changed the names of the intermediate
federal appellate courts from "United States Circuit Court of Appeals"
to "United States Court of Appeals" for the circuits, Act of June 25,
1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. 992.
28 U. S. C. § 41 changed the number of circuits from ten to
eleven to include the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as
a court to be designated as are the other intermediate appellate courts.
See note 8 ante. Title 18 originally did not conform to these
changes. The statute was amended by the Act of May 24, 1949, c. 139,
§ 58 to affect-conformity.
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important, though not heavy, proportion of the business of
the Court."
11. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, Op. cit. supra, note 3, 119.
In addition to the cases cited elsewhere in this article which deal
specifically with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Court has
accepted jurisdiction without question and delivered opinions in the fol-
lowing cases decided under this statute.
United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39 (1907); United States v.
Herr, 211 U. S. 406 (1908); United States v. Sullenberger, 211 U. S.
522 (1908); United States vr. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50 (1909);
United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 200 (1909); United States v.
Mason, 218 U. S. 517 (1909); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S.
506 (1910); United States v. Hammers, 221 U. S. 220 (1910); United
States v. Johnson, 221 U. S. 488 (1910); United States v. Baltimore
& Ohio S. W. R. Co., 222 U. S. 8 (1911); United States v. Plyler, 222
U. S. 15 (1911) ; United States v. Stever, 222 U. S. 167 (1911) ; United
States v. Munday, 222 U. S. 175 (1911); United States v. Garbish, 222
U. S. 257 (1911); United States v. Morgan, 222 U. S. 274 (1911);
United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513 (1911); United States v. Ander-
son, 228 U. S. 52 (1912) ; United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525 (1912) ;
United States v. Mesa, 228 U. S. 533 (1912) ; United States v. Shelley,
229 U. S. 239 (1912); United States v. Buchanan, 232 U. S. 72 (1913);
United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442 (1913); United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914); United States v. Salen, 235 U. S. 237
(1914); United States v. Wigger, 235 U. S. 276 (1914); United States
v. Lewis, 235 U. S. 282 (1914); United States v. Erie R. Co., 235 U. S.
513 (1914) ; United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140 (1914) ; United States
v. Smull, 236 U. S. 405 (1914); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S.
78 (1914); United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117 (1915); United
States v. Union Mfg. Company, 240 U. S. 605 (1915); United States
v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73 (1915); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241
U. S. 394 (1915); United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591 (1915); United
States v. Quiver, 241 U. S. 602 (1915) ; United States v. Kenofskey, 243
U. S. 440 (1916); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476 (1916);
United States v. Morehead, 243 U. S. 607 (1916); United States v.
Bathgate, 246 U. S. 220 (1917); United States v. Schider, 246 U. S.
519 (1917); United States v. Soldama, 246 U. S. 530 (1917); United
States v. Weitzel, 246 U. S. 533 (1917); United States v. Hill, 248 U.
S. 420 (1918); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1918); United
States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373 (1918); United States v. Ferger (No.
2), 250 U. S. 207 (1918); United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.
S. 210 (1919); United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465 (1919); United
States v. Butt 254 U. S. 38 (1920); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.
S. 281 (19201; United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491 (1920);
Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U. S. 102 (1920); United
States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138 (1920); United States v. Hutto (No.
1), 256 U. S. 524 (1920); United States v. Hutto (No. 2), 256 U. S.
530 (1920) ; United States v. Sacks, 257 U. S. 37 (1921) ; United States
v. Janowitz, 257 U. S. 42 (1921); United States v. Balint, 258 U. S.
250 (1921); United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280 (1921); United
States v. Wong Sing, 260 U .S. 18 (1922); United States v. Bowman,
260 U. S. 94 (1922); United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922);
United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477 (1922); United States v.
Walter, 263 U. 'S. 15 (1923); United States v. Dickey, 268 U. S. 378
(1924); United States v. The Baltimore Post, 268 U. S. 388 (1924)-
United States v. P. Koenig Coal Co., 270 U. S. 512 (1925); United
States v. Michigan Portland Cement Co., 270 U. S. 521 (1925); United
States v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201 (1925); United States v. Katz, 271 U.
S. 354 (1925); United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467 (1925); United
States v. McElvain, 272 U. S. 633 (1926); United States v. Noveck,
273 U. S. 202 (1926); United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 262 (1926);
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Attacks on the constitutionality of these provisions have
been few. The Court has sustained the statute against con-
tentions that it violates the Fifth Amendment.12 Nor is the
statute unconstitutional because it allows the United States
to appeal where a demurrer to the indictment is sustained,
and gives the accused no similar right where the demurrer
is overruled.1 3 Similarly, the statute is not open to attack
on the ground that it calls for advisory opinions.' 4
The Rule of Strict Construction. The Supreme Court
has generally construed the criminal appeals statute strictly
against the right of the United States to appeal directly to
it from an adverse District Court decision. The "exceptional
right to review in favor of the United States"'15 is "an in-
novation in criminal jurisdiction in certain classes of prose-
cutions, which cannot be extended beyond its terms." '16
One exception to this strict construction, however, is
to be observed in the ruling that informations brought by
the United States for the punishment of criminal contempts
constitute offenses against the United States and are "crimi-
nal cases" within the meaning of the statute,17 although not
United States v. Fruit Growers Exp. Co., 279 U. S. 363 (1928); United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (1929); United States v. Unzeuta,
281 U. S. 138 (1929); United States v. Adams, 281 U. S. 202 (1929);
United States v. Farrar, 281 U. S. 624 (1929) ; United States v. Sprague,
282 U. S. 716 (1930) ; United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424 (1931) ;
United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518 (1931); United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932); United States
v. Darby, 290 U. S. 224 (1933); United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S.
217 (1933); United States v. Troy, 293 U. S. 58 (1934); United States
v. Resnick, 299 U. S. 207 (1936) ; United States v. Curtis Wright Export
Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144 (1937); United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U.
S. 68 (1938); United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1938); United
States v. Powers, 307 U. S. 214 (1938); United States v. Harris, 311
U. S. 292 (1940); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1940); United
States v. Resler, 313 U. S. 57 (1940); United States v. Monia, 317 U.
S. 424 (1942) ; United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U. S. 702 (1942); United
States v. Gaskin, 320 U. S. 527 (1943); United States v. Saylor, 322
U. S. 385 (1943) ; United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U. S. 360 (1944);
United States v. Evans, 333 U. S. 483 (1947).
12. "We do not perceive the difficulty. No doubt of the power of
Congress is intimated in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1891).
If the Fifth Amendment has any bearing, the Act of 1907 is directed
to judgment rendered before the moment of jeopardy is reached."
Taylor v. United States, 297 U. S. 120, 127 (1935).
13. United States v. Bifty, 208 U. S. 393, 394, 400 (1907); United
States v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532, 545, 546 (1909).
14. United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 300, 301 (1908).
15. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 399 (1908).
16. United States v. Dickinson, 213 U. S. 92, 103 (1908).
17. United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 235, 236 (1927).
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criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment.18 When the contempt proceedings are both
civil and criminal in nature, apparently an appeal to the
Supreme Court will lie.", When the contempt proceedings
are purely civil, though the United States or one of its
agencies be seeking the relief, a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court would not be proper 20 under this statute.
Time for Taking Appeals. The statute provides that
"the appeal shall be taken within thirty days after the de-
cision or judgment has been rendered. . . ." The words
"decision or judgment"' have been construed where possible
to mean the entry of the order or judgment rather than the
filing of the opinion or a clerical docket entry.22 Thus, the
statute is in accord with Rule 37 (a) (2) of the Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure for the United States District Courts which
provides: "An appeal by the government when authorized
by statute may be taken within thirty days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. '23
Prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 4 the Court had
18. Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 105 (1923); Blackmer
v. United States, 284 1J. S. 421, 440 (1931).
Criminal contempt proceedings need not be begun by indictment.
The formalities are specified in the Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, Rule 42.
19. "Where a judgment of contempt is embodied in a single order
which contains an admixture of criminal and civil elements, the criminal
aspect of the order fixes its character for the purposes of procedure or
review." Penfield Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 330 U.
S. 585, 591 (1946).
20. Penfield Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 330 U. S.
585 (1946).
21. "The words 'decision' and 'judgment' as used in the [Criminal
Appeals] Act are not intended to describe two judicial acts, but a
single act described in alternative phrases. Cf. Ex parte Tiffany, 252
U. 5. 32, 36 (1919)." United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 533 n. 5(1942).
22. United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U. S. 161, 162
n. 1 (1938). United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 535 (1942). Ab-
sent uniform procedure in the trial courts, the term order or judgment
can have no fixed meaning.
23. Unlike the "Rules of Practice and Procedure, After Plea of
Guilty, Verdict or Finding of Guilt, in Criminal Cases Brought in the
District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the
Dibtrict of Columbia," promulgated by the Supreme Court on May 7,
1934, 292 U. S. 661 (1933), there can be no doubt that the Rules of
Criminal Procedure are fully applicable to authorized appeals to the
Supreme Court by the United States in criminal cases. Rule 54 (a)(1); see also Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 37 (a) (2) and 54 (c).
24. The rules became effective on March 21, 1946. Rule 59.
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held that the time to appeal could not be extended.2 5 And
this ruling has been restated in Rule 45(b) .26
The District Court's Decision must be Based on a Con-
struction of the Statute. It is essential to the maintenance
of an appeal purportedly raising an issue as to the construc-
tion of a statute underlying the indictment that the District
Court's decision be based on a construction of the statute
and not on a construction of the indictment or a ruling upon
its sufficiency upon matters not involving the statute.2 7
Where the decision holding the indictment insufficient is
based entirely on a construction of the indictment itself,
that ruling is not subject to review by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court,28 and where such a ruling may be the ground
for the appeal, the appeal will be referred to the appropriate
Court of Appeals for consideration on the merits.29
No Appeal Lies to the Supreme Court Where An Inde-
pendent Non-Appealable Ground is one of the Bases for the
District Court Judgment. Although it was clear, soon after
enactment of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, that the
Supreme Court could review on direct appeal only the
particular questions mentioned therein, this limitation upon
the scope of review promptly created the issue as to what
dispositions should be made of the case where the District
Court had not placed its decision solely on the invalidity or
construction of the statute but had also sustained the de-
fense motion directed to the indictment on wholly inde-
pendent grounds. Doubts as to jurisdiction were at first
resolved in favor of the right to appeal: it was held that
25. United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 533 (1943): "Neither the
District Court nor this court has power to extend the period."
26. Rule 45 (b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts states: "(b) ENLARGEMENT. When an act
is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if application there-
for is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion permit the act to
be done after the expiration of the specified period if the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but the court may not enlarge the
period for taking any action under Rules 33, 34, and 35, except as
otherwise provided in those rules, or the period for taking an appeal."
27. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 193 (1939).
28. United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Nay. Co., 228 U. S. 87,
108 (1912); United States v. New South Farm & Home Co., 241 U. S.
64, 71, 72, 73 (1915).
29. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers, 335 U.S.
802 (1947).
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the Supreme Court could consider the questions specified in
the statute, although the decision of the District Court on
other grounds could not be reviewed.30 Under this ruling,
however, the Supreme Court found itself in the position of
reviewing "a judgment which we cannot disturb, because
it rests adequately upon a basis not subject to our examina-
tion," and thus, in effect, of rendering "an abstract opinion,
which might or might not fit a subsequent prosecution of
the same defendant or others but would not determine the
instant case." 3' 1 Accordingly, the Court reversed its earlier
position and held that the provisions limit the right to appeal
to those situations where the decision or judgment of the
District Court is "based" solely upon the invalidity or con-
struction of the statute.3 2  The Court has adhered to this
position since its decision in the Hastings case.3 3 Adherence
to this doctrine has been made easier by the 1942 amend-
ment to the statute, since the United States may still have
relief in the Courts of Appeals where the Supreme Court re-
fuses jurisdiction on this ground.3 4
Rules for Determining Whether a District Court De-
cision is Based on Construction of Statute. The question
whether the decision of the District Court is, in a particular
case, based upon construction of the statute or upon con-
struction of the indictment not infrequently presents diffi-
culties. The clear case of a decision based upon a construc-
tion of the indictment only is where the District Court has
found the indictment fails to allege sufficient facts to satisfy
some admitted requirement of the statute, or to connect the
defendant with the crime charged, or is otherwise insuffi-
cient as a criminal pleading5 But no general rule can be
stated. The Supreme Court must determine the point in
each case by interpreting the decision of the District Court
"as 'accurately as may be."3 6  The meaning of the opinion
30. United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190, 195, 196 (1909).
31. United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188, 193 (1935). See also
United States v. Davis, 243 U. S. 570, 571 (1916).
32. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 (1939); Petrillo v.
United States, 332 U. S. 1 (1946).
133. Ibid; United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U. S. 200 (1942);
United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942).
34. United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942).
35. United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Nay. Co., 228 U. S. 87,
108 (1912); United States v. New South Farm & Home Co., 241 U. S.
64, 73 (1915); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 86 (1916).
36. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 306 (1918).
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of the District Court in this aspect has more than once been
"the subject of serious controversy" in the Supreme Court
on appeals under this statute.3 7  "The difficulty," said the
Court in United States v. New South Farm & Home Co.,38
"is to indicate a distinction" between the construction of the
statute and the construction of the indictment on which it
is founded.
Nevertheless, some rules have evolved. It has been de-
cided that although there may be an abstract distinction
between the "construction" and the "interpretation" of a
statute, both are within the concept of the statute governing
these appeals.3 9 It is settled that when the District Court
holds that the acts charged do not fall within the condemna-
tion of the statute the court necessarily has construed the
statute and an appeal will lie.40  A statute may be miscon-
strued within the meaning of the appeals statute not only
by misinterpreting its language but by overlooking its exis-
tence and failing to apply its provisions to an indictment
which sets out facts constituting a violation of its terms. 41
And a ruling that the indictment does not charge an offense
under any federal statute necessarily involves the construc-
tion of any statute to which the indictment can be referred.4 2
A question of the propriety of the venue has been held
to require a construction of the statute, not only where the
venue provisions are a part of the substantive statute,43 but
even where the venue provisions are contained in a separate
statute.44
37. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 98, 99(1919) ; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 302, 306 (1918) ;
United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 544 (1912); tnited States v.
Carbone, 327 U. S. 633 (1945) ; United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S.
442 (1942).
38. 241 U. S. 64, 73 (1915).
39. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 385, 386 (1908); United
States v. Biggs, 211 U. S. 507, 518 (1908).
40. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 535 (1912); United
States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223, 230 (1913); United States v. Nixon,
235 U. S. 231 (1914); United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 385(1914); United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339, 342, 343 (1925); United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 (1939); United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1943).
41. United States v. Malphurs, 316 U. S. 1 (1941).
42. United States v. Nixon, 235 U. S. 231, 235 (1914); see also
United States v. Malphurs, 316 U. S. 1 (1941).
43. United States v. Anderson, 328 U. S. 699 (1945); United States
v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U. S. 161 (1938).
44. United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273 (1944).
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Where the indictment charges a violation of regulations
issued in amplification of a criminal statute, a ruling that the
regulations are invalid may involve a construction of the
statute. 5 And a review of a decision quashing an indict-
ment, when such decision is based on a construction of the
statute on which the indictment is founded, is not to be de-
feated by the contention that a motion to quash involves the
exercise of the discretion of the trial court.48
Appeals Where Decision is Based on Invalidity of
Statute. The Supreme Court has not had the occasion, under
this statute, to resolve the niceties of issues as to when the
validity of a federal statute is called into question.4T  For
appeals under this statute lie whether the ruling that the
indictment is bad be based on the construction or on the
invalidity of the statute. Thus decisions sustaining demur-
rers to indictments have been held to be appealable under
the statute, as being based on the invalidity of the law on
which the indictment was founded, where the iuling was
that the statute, properly construed, embraced the act or
acts charged in the indictment, but that, so construed, the
statute was void as beyond the constitutional powers of
Congress.4 8 Such rulings would, however, have been review-
able under the statute even if the decisions of the District
Courts had been interpreted as ruling that the statutes could
not be construed as embracing the act or acts charged.
If questions of both construction and validity are
present in the same case, the Supreme Court, of course, will
turn the decision of the case upon the former, where that is
possible,49 in deference to the established principle that ques-
tions of a constitutional nature will not be decided unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. 50 Where more
45. United States v. Anderson, 328 U. S. 699, 702 n. 5 (1945);
United States v. Foster, 233 U. S. 515, 522, 523 (1913). See United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 514 (1910); United States v. Birdsall,
233 U. S. 230 (1913).
46. United States v. Heinze (No. 2), 218 U. S. 547, 550, 551 (1909).
47. Compare 62 Stat. 992, 28 U. S..C. § 1254 (1) (1948).
48. United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 202 (1918).
49. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 325 U.
S. 106 (1944); United States v. Petrillo, 322 U. S. 1 (1943). See
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 88 (1920).
50. E.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288,
345, 346 (1935); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325
U. S. 450 (1944); Alma Motor Co. v. Timkin-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S.
129 (1946); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1946);
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1946).
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than one constitutional question is raised, the Court will
decide those ripe for decision and remand the case as to the
others which cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss
for invalidity.51
Necessity for Showing that Decision or Judgment Set-
ting Aside or Dismissing An Indictment or Information or
Arresting Judgment is Based on Invalidity or Construction
of Statute. Prior to the 1942 amendment, where the ground
of decision of the District Court did not clearly appear, the
appeal was dismissed for failure of an affirmative showing
that the judgment or decision turned upon a controverted
construction of the statute upon which the indictment was
founded or upon its invalidity.52 Under the statute as it now
reads, the Court instead of dismissing "shall" transfer the
case to the proper Court of Appeals.3 Where the grounds
of the District Court's decision are ambiguous, the Court
may refuse, in the absence of a clear expression of the
grounds of decision, to review the entire record or to analyze
the indictment in order to ascertain whether the action of
the Court below might have been based on the construction
or invalidity of the statute.54  Or it may resolve for itself
the ambiguity and then go on to determine its jurisdiction.55
In order to guard against problems of this character, the
United States has sought in some cases to have the District
Court execute a certificate declaring that its judgment was
put entirely on the construction or the invalidity of the
statute upon which the indictment was founded and to in-
clude such certificate in the transcript of the record on ap-
peal.5 6 Unfortunately, the practice of preparing such certi-
51. United States v. Petrillo, 322 U. S. 1 (1943); United States v.
Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942).
52. United States v. Moist, 231 U. S. 701, 702, 703 (1913); United
States v. Halsey, Stuart '& Co., 296 U. S. 451 (1935). Cf. United
States v. Nixon, 235 U. S. 231, 236 (1914).
53. Cf. United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U. S. 200 (1942),
United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942); United States v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers, 335 U. S. 802 (1948).
54. United States v. Carter, 231 U. S. 492, 493-494 (1913).
55. United States v. Carbone, 327 U. S. 633 (1945); United States
v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942).
56. See United States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357, 359 (1933); United
States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 145 (1932) ; United States v. Hastings,
296 U. S. 188, 191 (1935). See also, United States v. Storrs, 272 U. S.
652 (1926).
In United States v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 296 U. S. 451, (1935),
the district judge refused to sign such a certificate, but on the contrary
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ficate has not become uniform57 And in any event, the
Supreme Court will determine for itself what was actually
decided below, and for this purpose will look to the judgment
which was actually entered. The Court is not bound by the
stipulation of the parties. 8
Since the basis for the appeals in the first two cate-
gories authorized by the statute is a decision grounded upon
the construction or invalidity of the particular statute upon
which the indictment is based, the record should contain
an explicit declaration as to which statute the indictment is
founded upon as well as an explicit ruling upon its invalidity
or construction." Where the ruling of the District Court is
that the indictment does not charge an offense under any
federal statute, the Supreme Court will inquire whether, as
a matter of law, the facts alleged in the indictment state
an offense under any statute of the United States 0  Where
the District Court rules that the indictment is bad under a
specified statute and on the appeal the United States seeks
to sustain the indictment under a different statute, the Court
will remand the case to the District Court to consider the
newly raised issue, 61 although it has jurisdiction to resolve
the new question thus raised by itself.62
certified that his "decision and order quashing the indictment herein
were not based in any respect upon the invalidity or construction of
section 215 of the Criminal Code upon which the indictment in said
case is founded." The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of
an affirmative showing of jurisdiction.
57. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 55 and 56 ante.
58. United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 77, 78 (1910).
59. United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 18, 19 (1912); United
States v. Malphurs, 816 U. S. 1 (1941).
60. United States v. Nixon, 235 U. S. 231, 233-236 (1914). In this
case the indictment did not on its face disclose the statute under which
it was drawn, but both the endorsement and the caption described it
as being for the violation of a designated statute. In sustaining a
demurrer the District Court filed a memorandum correctly stating that
that statute did not create an offense for which the defendants could
be punished. The Supreme Court ruled that the caption and endorse-
ment were not controlling, and that the statute upon which the indict-
ment was founded was to be ascertained as a matter of law from the
facts therein charged. The exact language of the District Court's
ruling on demurrer was that "the indictment does not charge any of-
fense for which the (defendants) can be held." This was held neces-
sarily to involve the question whether there was any federal statute
which punished the acts charged, and this required a construction of
any statute to which the indictment could be referred. Finding such a
statute, the Supreme Court reversed.
61. United States v. Malphurs, 316 U. S. 1 (1941).
62. "While we have jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act
to pass upon the correctness of the order entered below, United States
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Scope of Review of District Court Decisions Based on
Construction or Invalidity of Statute. The scope of review
of the Supreme Court on direct appeals to it by the United
States in criminal cases is set forth in United States v.
Borden Co. :63
"The established principles governing our review are these:
(1) Appeal does not lie from a judgment which rests on the
mere deficiencies of the indictment -as a pleading, as dis-
tinguished from a construction of the statute which underlies
the indictment. 64 (2) Nor will an appeal lie in a case where the
District Court has considered the construction of the statutes
but has also rested its decision upon the independent ground
of a defect in pleading which is not subject to our examination.
In that case we cannot disturb the judgment and the question
of construction becomes abstract.65 (3) This Court must accept
the construction given to the indictment by the District Court
as this is a matter we are not authorized to review.66 (4)
When the District Court holds that the indictment, not merely
because of some deficiency in pleading but with respect to the
substance of the charge, does not allege a violation of the
statute upon which the indictment is founded, that is necessarily
a construction of that statute.67 When the District Court has
rested its decision upon the construction of the underlying
statute this Court is not at liberty to go beyond the question of
the correctness of that construction and consider other objec-
tions to the indictment.68 The Government's appeal does not
open the whole case.69"
Where, however, the District Court has ruled in favor
of the United States on several points of attack on the
validity of the underlying statute and against it on another
such attack, the indictment will be dismissed and an appeal
to the Supreme Court will lie.70  And if the Court rules in
v. Nixon, 235 U. S. 231 (1914), we think that it is advisable to vacate
the judgment and remand the case in its entirety." 316 U. S. at 3.
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 229 (1940);
United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937).
63. 308 U. S. 188, 193 (1939).
64. United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188, 192-194 (1935). In
this event the appeal will be transferred to the appropriate court of
appeals. United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 412 (1942).
65. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S.
583 (1943); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 (1940).
66. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1946); United States
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1940).
67. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1946).
68. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U. S. 304
(1936).
69. Ibid.
70. United States v. Biggs, 211 U. S. 507, 522 (1908).
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favor of the United States on the question appealed, the
Court will go on to consider the other objections to the
validity of the statute.7 1
Of course, if the District Court sustains the motion on
two grounds; each of which presents an appealable question
on direct appeal, the Supreme Court need determine only
one of them if its ruling thereon will preclude further prose-
cution of the case.7 2 If the United States is to prevail, how-
ever, the Court must necessarily pass on all questions open
to it and resolve each of them in favor of the appellant.7 3
And where the Supreme Court determines the issues of con-
struction and validity in favor of the United States, it will
so frame its decree, in an appropriate case, as to preserve
to the defendant his right to have the trial court pass upon
questions relating to the construction of the indictment and
its sufficiency as a criminal pleading upon 'general prin-
ciples.74
Criteria for Maintenance of Appeal from Decision Sus-
taining Motion in Bar. The third and final category of ap-
peals provided for by the statute consists of those "From
the decision or judgment sustaining a motion7 5 in bar, when
71. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S.
583 (1943).
72. United States v. Biggs, 211 U. S. 507, 522 (1908).
73. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S.
583 (1943).
74. United States v. Portale, 235 U. S. 27, 31 (1914); United States
v. New South Farm & Home Co., 241 U. S. 64 (1915); United States
v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Nay. Co., 228 U. S. 87, 108 (1912).
One of the limitations on the right of defendant to raise the issues
of validity and constitutionality apart from considerations of sufficiency
of the statute on other grounds is to be found in Rule 14 (b) (2) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts:
Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution
of the prosecution or in the indictment or information other
than it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion
shall include all such defenses and objections then available to
the defendant, failure to present any such defense or objection
as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court
for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack ofjurisdiction or the failure of the indictment or information to
charge an offense shall be noticed by the court at any time dur-
ing the pendency of the proceedings.
75. The word "motion" was substituted for the words "special
plea" at the time of the codification of Title 18. This change conforms
the statute to Rule 12 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts: "All other pleas, demurrers and motions
to quash are abolished, and defenses and objections raised before trial
which heretofore could have been raised by one or more of them shall
be raised only by motion to dismiss or grant appropriate relief as pro-
vided in the rules." See also Note 1 to Rule 12 (a).
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the defendant has not been put in jeopardy." The only
criteria are that a motion in bar shall have been sustained
and that the defendant shall not have been put in jeopardy.
It is not a prerequisite to appeals under this clause that the
District Court ruling shall have been based upon the in-
validity or construction of the statute upon which the in-
dictment is founded.76  Unlike the two preceding clauses in
the statute, this provision gives the Supreme Court the right
to review the precise question decided by the trial court in
sustaining a motion in bar, although the decision involves
the application rather than the invalidity or construction of
the statute underlying the indictment.77 Indeed, the validity
or construction of the indictment is not open for considera-
tion where the appeal is from a judgment sustaining such
a motion.7 8
Meaning of "Decision or Judgment Sustaining a Motion
in Bar." In determining whether the decision of the District
Court is appealable under this provision, the Supreme Court
is not concluded by the particular form or designation of
the pleading which was in fact filed by the defendant, or by
the order made thereon, or the propriety of either.79  The
Court looks to substance and not to form. If the issue raised
by the motion is such that the rule sustaining it, ex proprio
vigore and not by reason of extrinsic circumstances, bars
further prosecution for the offense charged unless reversed,
an appeal will lie. Thus, it has been immaterial that the
plea was erroneously designated as a plea in abatement, in-
stead of a plea in bar ;80 or that the ruling took the form of
granting motions to dismiss 81 or to quash,82 which were in
76. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 86 (1916).
77. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 283 (1909).
78. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 (1909); United States
v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72 (1910).
79. "The material question is not how the defendant's pleading is
styled but the effect of the ruling sought to be reviewed * * *. The
defense here'was in bar of the prosecution; to sustain it was to end
the cause and exculpate the defendants." United States v. Hark, 320
U. S. 531, 536 (1943).
80. United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 78 (1910).
81. United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236, 237 (1927).
82. United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531 (1943); United States
v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 86 (1916); United States v. Thompson,
251 U. S. 407, 412 (1919). Compare United States v. Adams Express
Co., 229 U. S. 381, 388 (1912), where the District Court treated a
motion to quash service as a demurrer to the indictment and sustained
it, basing the decision on construction of the statute. The Supreme
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substance motions in bar. But a motion to dismiss, based
upon the indictment, the bill of particulars and an affidavit
of defendant's counsel, and challenging the sufficiency of the
indictment in light of the bill of particulars, has been held
not to be "in substance" a motion in bar.83 And a plea in
abatement which is such in substance as well as in form does
not become a motion in bar within the meaning of the
statute, nor is the decision sustaining it reviewable directly
by the Supreme Court, merely by reason of the fact that
at the time the motion was sustained the statute of limita-
tions had intervened to bar further prosecution.
8 4
The elimination of the terms "pleas to the jurisdiction,
pleas in abatement, demurrers, special pleas in bar, and
motions to quash," by Rule 12 of the Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, gives added
emphasis to the Supreme Court's practice of looking through
the designation to the substance of the motion.
Appeals from Decisions Sustaining Motions in Bar-
Jeopardy. The provisions authorizing appeal from decisions
sustaining motions in bar are qualified by the condition:
"when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy." 85 One is
not put in jeopardy within the meaning of this provision when
the case has not been put upon trial,86 nor is one put in
jeopardy, prior to the beginning of the trial, by the entry
of a preliminary order to take testimony for use at the trial.8 7
Scope of Review on Appeals from Decisions Sustaining
Motions in Bar. When an appeal is taken from a decision
sustaining a motion in bar, the only question open in the
Court held that the ruling was appealable as one "setting aside" the
indictment on a construction of the underlying statute, within the mean-
ing of the first clause of the Criminal Appeals Act; therefore it did
not determine whether it was proper to treat the motion to quash
service as a demurrer to the indictment.
83. United States v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 296 U. S. 451 (1935).
84. United States v. Storrs, 272 U. S. 653, 654 (1926).
85. In answer to a constitutional argument against the maintenance
of an appeal by the United States from a decision quashing an indict-
ment on the trial court's construction of the statute (the appeal being
taken under the first clause of the statute), the Supreme Court said
that the statute "is directed to judgments rendered before the moment
of jeopardy is reached." Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120, 127
(1907). The only provision of the statute containing an express limita-
tion to that effect is that relating to appeals from decisions sustaining
motions in bar.
86. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 283 (1909).
87. United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 237 (1927).
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Supreme Court is whether the motion in bar can be sus-
tained.8  The purpose of the statute, to confine the United
States to a limited review in the Supreme Court, has been
effected by decisions limiting the consideration on appeal
to the grounds of decision mentioned in the statute, as well
where the decision is taken from a decision sustaining a
motion in bar,89 as where it is taken under either of the
two preceding clauses of the statute.90 Thus, the sufficiency
of the indictment will not be considered on appeals from
decisions sustaining motions in bar,91 for the Supreme Court
has only the "right to review the precise question decided
by a trial court in sustaining a plea in bar."92
Transfer of Appeals Taken to Wrong Court. In 1942,
Congress amended the governing statute so that appeals by
the United States involving attacks on the indictment but
not concerned with the validity or construction of the under-
lying statutes might be taken to the Courts of Appeals. At
the same time it provided for the transfer of the appeal to
the appropriate tribunal where the United States had ap-
pealed to the wrong court.
The purposes of the amendments, which were made. at
the instance of the Attorney General- are manifest. Suc-
cessful motions by the defendant directed to the indictment
and attacking the construction of the indictment as well as
the validity and construction of the underlying statute could
not be heard by the Supreme Court. Similarly, successful
motions by the defendant directed solely to the construction
of the indictment were outside the authority of the Supreme
Court to hear. It was to give the United States a remedy
in these situations that the Court of Appeals jurisdiction
was created.94 The transfer provisions were inserted "to
88. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 606 (1909).
89. United States v. Mason, 213 U. S. 115, 122 (1908); United
States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 606 (1909).
90. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 399 (1908).
91. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 86 (1916); United
States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 (1909); United States v. Mason, 213 U.
S. 115, 122 (1908).
92. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 283 (1909).
93. H. R. Rep. No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); S. Rep. No.
868, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H. R. Rep. No. 2052, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942).
94. United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U. S. 200, 209 (1942);
United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442, 445 (1942) ; United States
v. Carbone, 327 U. S. 633, 642-43 (dissenting opinion) (1942); United
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save the Government the right of appeal which might other-
wise be lost by its erroneous view as to the proper appellate
tribunal." 95  The transfer provisions, necessarily supple-
mental to the creation of jurisdiction in the Courts of Ap-
peals, were held not to be applicable to an appeal taken to
the Supreme Court before the effective date of the amend-
ment but dismissed by the Court after that date."
The Court has made use of the power to transfer where
the case involved several questions some of which were not
cognizable by the Supreme Court under the statute.97  The
Court has also acted in this manner where it is not clear
whether the question raised could be considered by it on
direct appeal.' 8 Where the case is transferred to the Court
of Appeals because it involves questions in addition to those
directed to the validity and construction of the underlying
statute, the Court of Appeals will consider all the questions
presented including the validity and construction of the
statute basing the indictment."
In one case involving a motion in bar, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to which the
appeal had erroneously been taken, certified the case to the
Supreme Court under the provisions of this Section."' 9 The
same Court certified a case to the Supreme Court where the
issue on appeal was the construction of the statute.10
Appeal by United States after Verdict in Favor of De-
fendant. Prior to the codification of Title 18, the governing
statute provided "That no appeal"02 shall be taken by or
allowed the United States in any case where there has been
States v. Petrillo, 832 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1946); 332 U. 'S. at 14-15 (con-
curring opinion) (1946).
95. United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U. S. 200, 209 (1938).
96. Ibid.
97. United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442 (1942).
98. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,
335 U. S. 802 (1947).
99. United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U. S. 442, 445 (1942). Pre-
sumably, therefore, on a direct appeal to a Court of Appeals, that court
will review all questions raised, including those going to validity or
construction of the underlying statute.
100. United States v. Hoffman, 161 F.2d 881 (App. D. C. 1946).
The opinion of the Court makes no mention of this unique way of
securing jurisdiction. It refers to the case as one on direct appeal
from the district court.
101. United States v. Waters, 175 F.2d 340 (Apn. D. C. 1949).
335 U. S. 77.
102. Originally read "writ 'of error."
[Vol. 24
19491 DIRECT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 565
a verdict in favor of the defendant." This proviso was held
to preclude appeal even though the verdict had been directed
before any proceedings in the trial court and although the
verdict was directed on the ground "that the indictment was
invalid because no offense was properly charged."103 The
Court in holding that no appeal would lie relied solely on the
proviso quoted above and without consideration of "other
objections. '1o4 This proviso was eliminated from the statute
at the time of the codification of Title 18. No suggestion
exists in the legislative history of the codification, however,
that the revisers proposed to make any such substantial
change as would follow from the intentional elimination of
this proviso. Nevertheless, the omission, whether deliberate
or inadvertent, reopens a question heretofore foreclosed by
United States v. Weissman.05
The right of the United States to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court from certain adverse District Court judg-
ments in criminal cases is only an historical vestige. Logic
there may be in permitting review of District Court de-
cisions construing or holding invalid important Congressional
enactments. But there is no reason for not placing this
power of review where it belongs, in the Courts of Appeals,
which in turn would be subject to supervision by the Supreme
Court through its certiorari power. The Supreme Court
docket is crowded enough without imposing on the Court
the obligation to review every District Court decision mis-
construing a federal criminal statute. The right of appeal
here, as in other instances where appeals of right exist,106 is
based on a mistrust of the judiciary on the lower levels of the
federal court system. Even if such lack of faith were war-
ranted, which it is not, the remedy cannot be by way of com-
pulsory review by the Supreme Court. Only history speaks
for the continuance of this compulsory review and it does
not speak loudly.
103. United States v. Weissman, 266 U. S. 377, 378 (1924).
104. Ibid.
105. 266 U. S. 377 (1924). Since the decision of this case in 1924,
it has never been cited, apparently for the reason that the question has
never again been raised.
106. E.g., 28 U. S. C. § 1252 (1948).
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